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Abstract This paper empirically analyses the relationship between the shadow banking
system and implementation of monetary policy in China using the VECM methodology.
We show that an increase in the size of shadow banking sector increases the independence
of bank lending from the policies of the People Bank of China. We also find that Shadow
Bankingworks in an asymmetric fashion in that it amplifies increases in themoney supply
but weakens the effects of restrictive interest rate-based monetary policy decisions.
Keywords Shadow banking . Chinese economy.Monetary policy
JEL classification E44 . E50 . G21 . G23
1 Introduction
Given the increasing global importance of the Chinese economy, there is a growing
debate in both academic and policy circles on the functioning of Chinese monetary
policy and its effects on the real economy. This literature presents mixed results, due to
major identification issues. 1 Chinese monetary policy seems unconventional given
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1See for example Sun (2013) for a review.
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Western standards and it is not clear what are all the factors affecting the money supply.
In particular, while Chinese monetary policy is extensively conducted by restrictions
and loan quotas on the official banking sector, there is also a sizable non-regulated
shadow banking sector that could in principle reinforce or weaken the monetary policy
decisions. In turn, monetary policy decisions could in principle take into account the
dynamics of the non-regulated sector and respond to it.
The economics literature has pointed to various channels through which monetary
policy can impact the real economy, but in the Chinese context there are various open
questions. While increases in bank reserve requirements appears to reduce economic
activity and inflation, it is not clear whether changes in Chinese interest rates also have a
substantial impact on economic activity and inflation. Moreover, it is not clear whether
other measures of changes in credit conditions, such as shocks to M2 or lending levels/
quotas, have an impact once bank reserves and interest rates are taken into account.
Two recent research papers on the topic reach different conclusions and exemplify
the ongoing debate. Fernald et al. (2014) claim that the monetary policy transmission
channels in China have moved closer to those of Western market economies and
become more effective. Conversely, Hou and Wang (2013) test the effect of reserve
requirements on the lending channel and find that as the degree of market-based
banking increases, China’s monetary policy transmission through the bank lending
channel weakens. In both articles bank lending is increasingly independent from the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC), but it is still an open question whether this support,
weakens or amplifies the effects of monetary policy.
To address these questions it is important to notice that the bank lending channel in
China is not standard because of the growing size of the largely unregulated shadow
banking sector. Our paper focuses on the Shadow Banking sector in China partly
because of the potentially negative effects that it could have on the national and even
global financial stability and to add to the growing research on the topic in recent years.
Most of the recent research on Chinese shadow banking has focused on its institutional
features and implications for financial stability, without making an explicit connection
between the Chinese shadow banking and monetary policy. Our paper aims to fill this
gap by presenting an empirical analysis of the role of the shadow banking system in the
implementation of Chinese monetary policy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent research on the
Chinese shadow banking system from an institutional perspective and aims to describe
its essential features, Section 3 outlines the Chinese shadow banking system. Section 4
presents our empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Chinese shadow banking sector an institutional review
The shadow banking sector has become a well-known worldwide phenomena since the
sub-prime loans crisis which exploded in 2007. The first use of the term is attributed to
Paul McCulley – a senior executive at PIMCO – who during a speech in September
20072 defined a shadow bank as “a levered-up financial intermediary whose liabilities
2 Speech at the annual financial symposium hosted by the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank in Jackson Hole,
Wyoming.
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are broadly perceived as of similar money-goodness and liquidity as conventional bank
deposits.” Shadow banking is nowadays a broadly used concept but not uniquely
defined. For example – in another famous speech in the aftermath of the financial
crisis– the former president of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke gave the following
definition3: “Shadow banking consists of a variety of institutions and markets that,
collectively, implement traditional banking functions-but do so outside, or in ways only
loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions.” Since
then, the Financial Stability Board has published more than 40 reports on the topic and
formally defined Shadow Banking as4: “A system of credit intermediation that involves
entities and activities outside the regular banking system, focusing on credit interme-
diation that takes place in an environment where prudential regulatory standards and
supervisory oversight are either not applied or are applied to a materially lesser or
different degree than is the case for regular banks engaged in similar activities.”
From these definitions it appears clear that shadow banks are financial firms
that perform similar functions and assume similar risks to banks, but by being
outside the formal banking sector they generally lack the standard safety nets,
such as guaranteed deposit insurance or access to lender of last resort facilities and
typically operate under a much lower level of regulatory oversight. Those features
generally imply a difficult trade-off for policymakers between the positive effects
that shadow banks can have on economic growth, by making financial services
cheaper and more widely available, and the risks that this implies for financial
stability due to lower safety margins and less regulation.
Influential early policy papers on the USA shadow banking system by Pozsar and
Singh (2011) and Pozsar et al. (2012) stress the function of shadow banking in
satisfying the demand of the mainstream investment management sector for maturity
transformation, through a wide range of securitization and secured funding techniques
such as asset-backed commercial paper, asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized
debt obligations and repurchase agreements (repos). In general, the principal function
of any bank is maturity transformation, given that lenders prefer deposits to be of a
shorter maturity than borrowers, who typically require loans for longer periods. Banks
are able to achieve this transformation by qualitative asset transformation, in other
words by exploiting the fact that only a small fraction of depositors have liquidity needs
at a given time. As such, a bank can store a small fraction of its deposits in the form of
liquid assets (readily convertible to cash) and lend out the rest in the form of term
(illiquid) loans. In the US experience credit intermediation through shadow banking,
unlike traditional banking which involves a simple process of deposit-taking and
originating loans that are held to maturity, employs a more complicated process which
relies in large part on securitization to achieve maturity transformation. At the deposit
end of this type of shadow banking are wholesale investors (providers of funds)
typically using the repo market and money market mutual funds to provide short-
term loans while at the loan origination end are traditional banks and other financial
institutions. The two ends are then connected by a complex intermediation chain of
shadow banks transforming the original loans into securitized products and then using
those securities as collateral to obtain short-term funding. It is now widely accepted that
3 See Bernanke (2012).
4 See FSB (2013).
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in the US, since the late 90’s, the shadow banking system provided sources of funding
for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like short-term
liabilities. Many recent research papers5 have studied how maturity and credit trans-
formation in the shadow banking system contributed first to credit-fueled asset bubbles
and then to the credit crunch and the 2007–09 financial crisis.
Shadow banking has been rapidly growing in manyWestern economies as well as in
China for the past two decades. Many experts on the banking industry of China
generally agree that shadow banking in China presents significant differences com-
pared to the one in Western developed countries and that it represents a challenge for
the future financial stability of the Chinese economy. Despite the growing interest in
Chinese shadow banking sector, there are only a small number of research articles on
the topic, with some of those only published in Chinese language.6
Chinese research shows that complex financial instruments like Asset Backed
Securities (ABS) do not dominate the Chinese Shadow Banking system, see for
example, Li et al. (2014). Unlike shadow banking in the US which is largely dependent
on capital markets and wholesale funding, Chinese shadow banking is mainly driven
by commercial banks. In a typical Chinese shadow banking operation, a commercial
bank savings and lending business is moved off-balance sheet by creating a shadow
trust company which typically operates under lesser regulation standards. More spe-
cifically, Li and Tian (2012) describe that shadow banking in China consists of three
parts of the financial services:
1) Bank internal off-balance sheet services, e.g. wealth management products and
securitization,
2) Credit creation services, e.g. non-banking financial intermediaries like entrust
loans (loans made on behalf of non bank financial corporations) and non-banking
trust loans.
3) Informal finance services, e.g. illegal private banks and less regulated small banks
including Guarantee Corporation, Small-loan Company and Private Equity Fund.
Other Chinese publications – see for example PBOC (2012) – provide a similar
account and classify the shadow banking system into three equivalent categories: bank-
dominated shadow banks, non-banking financial intermediaries and unregulated or less
regulated shadow banks. A recent report by Elliott et al. (2015) provides a very
informative account of the main features of Chinese shadow banking system by
reviewing some of the Chinese research and official PBOC reports. It appears that
shadow banking in China is largely driven by regulatory arbitrage and attempts by
regulated banks to avoid regulatory constraints. They outline how shadow banking in
China can be understood in the context of a system which remains dominated large
state-controlled banks and in which the state provides a great deal of direction to banks,
through a variety of regulations as well as formal and informal guidance. It is
understood that those constraints have become sufficiently binding so that business
has quickly and increasingly moved to shadow banks in the last few years.
5 See for example Brunnermeier (2009), Gennaioli et. al (2013), Adrian and Ashcraft (2012).
6 See FRBSF (2013), Li (2014) among the few examples of international research papers. Xianrong (2009),
PBOC (2012), Wang and Li (2013) are instead commonly cited Chinese publications.
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Such banking regulation can in turn to be viewed in the context of the
government monetary policy and the role of state-owned banks. An interesting
account of the development of the PBOC policies is provided by Sun (2013). The
PBOC was established on December 1st 1948, it was the only bank in China
before the economic reforms, combining the functions of a central bank and
commercial banks. With the 1984 central bank reform, the regular commercial
banking activities were separated from the PBOC and passed to four newly
established state-owned commercial banks, while the PBOC became exclusively
a central bank. The objectives of its monetary policy were defined in the People’s
Bank of China Act (promulgated in 1995) as “to maintain the stability of the value
of the currency and thereby promote economic growth”.
The PBOC therefore appears to pursue monetary policy with multiple objec-
tives of price stability, economic growth and exchange rate stability. Until 1997
the PBOC implemented monetary policy through the so-called credit plan. This
plan implied that the PBOC set the quantitative bank-specific loan quotas –which
were precise lending ceilings for individual financial institutions– and provided
liquidity to those banks which then allocated credit to government-preferred sub-
sectors and projects.7 According to the credit plan, banks adjusted their lending
activities to meet the loan quotas, but this direct control over the quantity of
lending of individual banks led to a mismatch between credit supply and demand
hindering the efficient allocation of credit. In 1996 the PBOC introduced the
growth rates of monetary aggregates (M1 and M2) as nominal anchors and
adopted them, together with the credit quotas, as its intermediate targets. Since
January 1998, bank-specific credit quotas have been formally abolished and the
PBOC has set the target for the total bank lending and used it as one of its
intermediate targets as well. Elliott et al. (2015) provide a summary of the other
main regulatory constraints that are pushing business away from regulated banks
towards shadow banks:
& The limit of bank loans to deposits of 75%
& Regulators discourage lending to certain industries, e.g. in recent years to the fast
appreciating residential real estate sector.
& Most non-bank channels have lower capital and liquidity requirements than regu-
lated banks.
& Shadow banks are not subject to bank limits on loan or deposit rates.
& Shadow banking avoids costly PBOC reserve requirements.
Interestingly, this regulatory arbitrage is explicitly recognized by the PBOC in its
definition of shadow banking: they define “China’s shadow banking [system] as credit
intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system” that
serves to provide “liquidity and credit transformation” and “which could potentially” be
a source of “systemic risk or regulatory arbitrage”.8
7 On this see also Montes-Negret (1995).
8 See PBOC (2013).
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3 Chinese shadow banking instruments and operations
As extensively discussed by Gao and Wang (2014) all definitions of shadow banking
pose practical difficulties, since just like other definitions of banking the definition will
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction due to their different cultures and traditions.
Another difficulty lies in the practical application of the definitions. In China, for
example, it is difficult to draw the line between those institutions and activities that are
guaranteed by the government and those that are not. Formally, there is no guarantee
system for bank deposits, but up until recent times virtually everyone assumed that the
government would in practice protect bank deposits.9 Furthermore, shadow banking is
a catch-all term rather than a category: it encompasses a very broad range of hetero-
geneous activities ranging from well-established, simple and normally low-risk prac-
tices (such as money market mutual funds) to new, exotic and poorly understood
transactions and this can make broad generalizations misleading.
It is fair to say that there is no consensus on which activities should be included and
this creates challenges for the measurement of the shadow banking sector. Elliott et al.
(2015) report a range of estimates of the size of the shadow banking sector in China
calculated by financial institutions.10 They report that depending on the definition and
estimates of some important statistics, six reasonable estimates in the recent past
produced figures ranging from about RMB 5 trillion to RMB 46 trillion, or roughly
8 to 80% of the size of China’s GDP. Similarly, comparing the features of shadow
banking in China and in Western countries, Wang and Li (2013) suggest that Chinese
shadow banking activities could be potentially defined according to different criteria:
1) Regulation - this can be understood as the definition of the Financial Stability
Board.
2) Organization - it recognizes the shadow banking system as the non-banking
financial institutions that operate in complicated financial derivative markets
(e.g. Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Default Swaps).
3) Function - it defines the shadow banking system as the credit intermediation that is
endowed with the functions of the credit swap, maturity transformation and
liquidity transformation.
As already mentioned, financial derivative products and maturity transformation do
not appear to describe the majority of the shadow banking activity in China, therefore
the first regulation criteria has been the one adopted is analyzing shadow banking in
China. The shadow banking system in China may be identified with the securitization
services of commercial banks without legal or with insufficient regulations, such as the
collaboration between banks and trust companies.11 The estimate of its size should
include asset management financial products of commercial banks, entrust funds, non-
discount bank acceptance bills, private lending and credit services and private equity
funds. It appears to be especially dominated by financial products like asset
9 This was evident during recent defaults of some SB institutions, see for example Economist (2014a) and
Economist (2014b).
10 See also Zhu, Ng, and Jiang (2013) and FSB (2014).
11 See for example Xiao et al. (2012).
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management financial pools, insurance products, trust funds, investment funds and
entrusted loans.
As described by FRBSF (2013), a typical Chinese shadow banking transaction can
be one in which a state-owned company borrows from a state-owned bank at a
government-set low interest rate; the company then re-lends the money at a signifi-
cantly higher interest rate to a private trust company that is part of the shadow banking
sector which is free of loans’ regulatory constraints; that Trust company then lends the
money to a more speculative sector of the economy, such as real estate development,
which would not have been possible for the state-owned bank. Trust companies are
financial firms in China that have a quite flexible charter, combine elements of banks
and asset managers and have wide latitude to operate across the financial sector. These
companies expanded rapidly because their wealth management products (WMPs) offer
rates of return as much as 15%.
WMPs form another very important component of the Chinese shadow banking
system. These are investment products that provide a return based on the performance
of a pool of underlying assets. Typically the underlying investment is a single large loan
or a pool of loans. WMPs are generally offered to customers as higher-yielding
alternatives to traditional deposits by banks or Trust companies. WMPs are included
in discussions of shadow banking in large part because they are a close substitute for
bank deposits. In principle, banks simply manage WMP assets on behalf of clients,
with the client, not the bank, exposed to losses if the assets decline in value. Anecdotal
evidence and polling results demonstrate that in practice WMP investors strongly
assume that the target return of these products is effectively guaranteed by any bank
or Trust associated with the product. Sponsors have apparently rescued a number of
failed WMPs, although this has been done with little transparency.12
The relationship between Trust companies and WMPs has been highlighted as
one of the possible drivers for future financial instability in the Chinese economy.
Banks do not hold the described loans on their balance sheets or set aside capital
against their potential defaults. Instead, they typically extend them via intermedi-
ary Trust Companies that are not allowed to accept deposits or formally loan out
money, but are allowed to manage it. Trust companies create investment products
like WMPs which banks market in return for a commission. The Trust can then
invest the money gathered through a WMP in a given company. The typical
lending cycle of a WMP is presented in Fig. 1. Moreover, there is a further layer
of lack of transparency as WMPs are usually of short maturity and therefore banks
have the flexibility to move assets and liabilities on- and off-balance-sheet by
choosing the start-and end-dates of WMPs so as to maintain a low average deposit
balance to avoid high reserve requirements. The true nature of the connection
between WMPs, trust companies and traditional banks is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Numerous market reports have pointed out to the high risks of these products and
the issues related to the lack of transparency.13
Further complexity arises from the fact that Trust companies and banks are
interconnected through ownership and business operations. It is common practice
for banks to own controlling shares in Trust companies. Furthermore, in the so-
12 See the already mentioned Economist (2014a) and Economist (2014b).
13 See for example Tao and Deng (2013) and Zhu, Ng, and Jiang (2013).
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called bank-Trust cooperation model, banks channel funds to Trusts via entrusted
loans. Entrusted loans are another important component of the shadow banking
system. These are loans made by firms in the non-financial economy that are run
through banks for legal reasons but with the banks indemnified from the credit
risk of the borrower by the non-financial firm. Some entrusted loans are funded by
state-owned enterprises as a way of profiting from their ability to borrow cheaply
and in large volume by on-lending the funds they obtain. However, the majority of
Fig. 1 Wealth management and shadow banking in China. Source: Guilford (2014)
Fig. 2 An illustration of trust companies’ business model. Source Li (2014)
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entrusted loans appear to be lent within a corporate group, with HKMA (2014)
showing 74% of this lending was to subsidiaries and 7% to other affiliates.
Lending within a corporate group would not be considered shadow banking under
standard definitions, but it is difficult to separate this out from loans to unrelated
parties. This analytical problem leads to most SB estimations calculations treating
all entrusted loans as shadow banking, even though this doubtless exaggerates the
size of shadow banking in China.
As reported by Elliott et al. (2015), other instruments usually classified as part of
shadow banking are the following:
& Bankers Acceptances - notes issued by banks that promise to pay a fixed amount a
few months in the future. Generally these are supposed to be issued in connection
with a non-financial transaction, such as a purchase of goods, but reports suggest
they are often used more loosely.
& Micro-finance companies - these are separately regulated financial firms that are
licensed to lend in small amounts to help encourage credit access for small and rural
borrowers.
& Financial leasing - this represents leasing of all kinds that is not already on a bank
or Trust company balance sheet and is not a short-term operating lease.
& Guarantees - Guarantee companies in China provide financial guarantees, includ-
ing those to facilitate shadow banking transactions. Many guarantee companies
have branched out to make direct loans, even though they do not have legal licenses
to do so.
& Pawn shops and various unofficial lenders - Pawn shops are important lenders to
some households and small businesses. In addition, there are other types of lenders
that operate informally or even clearly illegally.
& Trust Beneficiary Rights (TBRs) – these are effectively a simple form of derivative
transaction whereby the purchaser of the TBR receives all or a stated proportion of
the returns accruing to a Trust. Banks sometimes use TBRs as part of complex
shadow banking transactions to keep the economic benefits of a loan without
showing it as a loan on their balance sheets, but moving it to a more favorably
treated investment category.
& Inter-bank market activities - another substitute for formal deposits is created
using the inter-bank market. Despite its name, many participants in this market
are not banks but are large corporations using a finance company subsidiary to
participate. They can lend money to banks in deposit-like arrangements with-
out being subject to caps on deposit rates and without forcing banks to incur
many of the regulatory costs of deposits, such as triggering the minimum
reserve requirements.
Virtually all estimates of the size of shadow banking in China start with figures
provided by the PBOC on the level of “Total Social Financing” (TSF). The PBOC
provides these figures for the year 2002 and onwards, in recognition that banks
ceased to be the only finance sources that mattered and it became necessary to
examine a fuller range of financial activity. Shadow banking comprises much of
the non-bank TSF activities and Fig. 3 reports the magnitudes of the various
components over time. In line with the most of the literature, e.g. Wang and Li
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(2013), Elliott et al. (2015), in our paper the size of the shadow banking system in
China is calculated through total amount of Trust loans, entrust loans and the
financial products of commercial banks that are cross-cooperated by banks and
trust companies. Zhu, Ng, and Jiang (2013) estimate that these three elements
occupy at least half of the total shadow banking size in China and that the
statistical data of remaining shadow banking activity is too separated and difficult
to estimate.
4 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis aims to shed light on the impact of Chinese shadow
banking system on the effectiveness of monetary policy. As the recent literature
shows that bank lending is increasingly independent from the PBOC, it remains an
open question whether shadow banking lending supports, weakens, or amplifies
the effects of monetary policy. Theoretically, the shadow banking system trans-
mission mechanism is negatively related to the efficiency of monetary policy. For
example, the tight monetary policy aims to reduce the money supply in the
market, which is followed by the increase of the loan interest rate. As the cost
of financing increases, medium and small sized firms might have difficulties
obtaining loans from banks. When this occurs, enterprises may prefer to finance
through shadow banking because credit services of the shadow banking system
Fig. 3 Net flows of total social financing. Source: Elliott et al. (2015)
Table 1 Augmented Dickey–
Fuller test in levels
ADF-Fisher Chi-square P-value
GDP 0.0737
CPI 0.0000
SBS 0.0000
RF 0.0635
M1 0.2242
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can offer low-interest loans to those companies. Under such circumstances, there
is a reasonable possibility that the narrow money supply might rise or remain at
the same level under this situation. Since the shadow banking system scale is
highly developed, the tightening of monetary policy may not work and the
inflation rate might actually rise. The credit creation function of the shadow
banking system might affect the statistical accuracy of the money supply. How-
ever, the existence of the shadow banking system might benefit economic growth
due to its cheap financing cost. Conscious of the complexities of the problem and
data limitations, we take a natural first step to the research question by using a
standard VAR model. The model is estimated by using monthly data from January
2002 to June 2014 from the Chinese WIND financial market and macro-economic
dataset.
Variables The five variables that we use are:
1) GDP – proxied by Industrial production.
2) CPI: Consumer Price Index.
3) SBS: Size of the SB system China, calculated using monthly data of the total
amount of trust loans, entrust loans and financial products of commercial banks.
4) RF: Base interest rate. The periods of credit services offered by the shadow
banking system is usually less than one year. Hence, it is represented by the
Table 2 Augmented Dickey–
Fuller test in differences
ADF-Fisher Chi -square P-value
ΔGDP 0.0000
ΔCPI 0.0071
ΔSBS 0.0000
ΔRF 0.0001
ΔM1 0.0000
Table 3 Optimal lags selection criteria
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 −1926.382 NA 543,676.3 27.39549 27.50006 27.43799
1 −1823.296 197.3986 179,649.6 26.28789 26.91529 26.54284
2 −1750.758 133.7582 91,655.82 25.61359 26.76382* 26.08100*
3 −1723.778 47.83806 89,412.99 25.58550 27.25855 26.26537
4 −1694.698 49.49782* 84,914.66* 25.52763* 27.72351 26.41996
5 −1681.460 21.59314 101,358.7 25.69447 28.41318 26.79926
6 −1660.271 33.06175 108,621.2 25.74852 28.99006 27.06577
7 −1649.170 16.53258 135,137.1 25.94567 29.71005 27.47539
8 −1636.041 18.62344 164,562.6 26.11405 30.40125 27.85622
*indicates lag order selected by the criterion
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Chinese short-term (6 to 12 months) loan interest rate. It changes frequently
following the announcement of Chinese central bank.
5) M1: Narrow money supply in China.
Stationarity test We test for stationarity by the ADF test with trend and intercept. The
results are reported in Table 1, where ×1 to ×5 represent the 5 variables in the described
order. As Table 1 shows, GDP, RF and M1 are non-stationary at 5% confidence level.
As a result we take the first difference of each variable and we perform the test again;
the results in the Table 2 show that all first differences are stationary and that the
maximum order of integration is I(1).
Fig. 4 Inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial
Table 4 Johansen Co-integration test
2002 M06 2014 M06
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: GDP M1 RF SBS CPI
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.556952 212.5125 69.81889 0.0000
At most 1 * 0.259986 94.47130 47.85613 0.0000
At most 2 * 0.200774 50.81374 29.79707 0.0001
At most 3 * 0.086623 18.31762 15.49471 0.0183
At most 4 * 0.035091 5.179634 3.841466 0.0228
Trace test indicates 5 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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Optimal lags We determine the appropriate maximum lag length for the vari-
ables in the VAR, using the usual information criteria, such as AIC, SIC. Table 3
lists the recognized best lag length of the VAR according to five measurements.
As the results indicate, the minimum lag length selected by LR, FPE and AIC is
4 lags, whereas the minimum lag length of SC and HQ is 2 lags. Hence,
according to the popularity criteria we choose a 4 lag length as the appropriate
lag of the VAR model.
Table 5 Granger Causality Tests
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 2002 M01 2014 M06
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
Dependent variable: GDP
M1 2.129897 4 0.7119
RF 16.55801 4 0.0024
SBS 0.268956 4 0.9917
CPI 7.907255 4 0.0950
All 35.46794 16 0.0034
Dependent variable: M1
GDP 0.435110 4 0.9795
RF 11.02182 4 0.0263
SBS 1.244395 4 0.8707
CPI 1.902746 4 0.7536
All 14.60704 16 0.5536
Dependent variable: RF
GDP 2.696623 4 0.6098
M1 1.078552 4 0.8977
SBS 1.140827 4 0.8877
CPI 8.730744 4 0.0682
All 14.06500 16 0.5939
Dependent variable: SBS
GDP 21.03281 4 0.0003
M1 32.83687 4 0.0000
RF 0.876610 4 0.9279
CPI 1.754459 4 0.7808
All 53.74466 16 0.0000
Dependent variable: CPI
GDP 2.483935 4 0.6475
M1 9.016734 4 0.0607
RF 14.53873 4 0.0058
SBS 1.708954 4 0.7891
All 31.41556 16 0.0119
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Unit root test In order to ensure that the VAR model is stable we test that all the
inverse characteristic roots of VAR lie inside the unit circle. Figure 4 shows that
all the inverse root of the AR characteristic polynomial locate inside of the unit
circle. Therefore VAR model is stationary and available to be used to work with
other tests.
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Fig. 5 Impulse response functions
T. Gabrieli et al.
Table 6 Impulse-response magnitudes (M1 before RF)
Response of LOG_M1: Period LOG_M1 LOG_RF LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 0.008893 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
(0.00052) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
2 −0.001096 −1.70E-05 0.001936 0.000188 0.001574
(0.00080) (0.00078) (0.00077) (0.00076) (0.00079)
3 −0.000684 0.000120 −0.000641 −0.000135 0.001096
(0.00080) (0.00079) (0.00077) (0.00076) (0.00079)
4 0.001527 −0.001886 0.001104 0.000290 0.001041
(0.00081) (0.00079) (0.00076) (0.00073) (0.00075)
Response of LOG_RF: Period LOG_M1 LOG_RF LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 −6.92E-06 0.000674 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
(5.6E-05) (3.9E-05) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
2 −7.39E-05 0.000588 2.31E-05 −4.30E-05 0.000122
(7.7E-05) (6.8E-05) (5.8E-05) (5.8E-05) (6.0E-05)
3 −3.03E-05 0.000537 −3.17E-05 −1.23E-05 0.000148
(9.0E-05) (8.4E-05) (7.8E-05) (7.1E-05) (7.8E-05)
4 −1.36E-05 0.000710 −4.69E-05 1.99E-05 0.000164
(0.00011) (0.00010) (8.8E-05) (7.6E-05) (8.3E-05)
Response of LOG_SBS: Period LOG_M1 LOG_RF LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 0.134731 0.009924 0.419338 0.000000 0.000000
(0.03560) (0.03471) (0.02454) (0.00000) (0.00000)
2 −0.186571 0.032980 −0.183078 −0.011754 0.057156
(0.04290) (0.04072) (0.03911) (0.03726) (0.03908)
3 0.004789 −0.024754 −0.026557 −0.003784 −0.025209
(0.04442) (0.04353) (0.04256) (0.04348) (0.04442)
4 −0.005390 −0.051669 0.108986 0.009791 0.028276
(0.04455) (0.04409) (0.04171) (0.04202) (0.04333)
Response of LOG_GDP:Period LOG_M1 LOG_RF LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 −0.000199 −0.000615 0.000842 0.008424 0.000000
(0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00049) (0.00000)
2 0.000341 −0.000148 2.32E-05 0.002943 −0.001367
(0.00078) (0.00077) (0.00077) (0.00074) (0.00075)
3 0.000179 0.001595 0.000151 0.003487 −0.001013
(0.00084) (0.00083) (0.00082) (0.00074) (0.00076)
4 0.000533 0.002285 0.000639 0.002948 0.000826
(0.00088) (0.00087) (0.00084) (0.00073) (0.00075)
Response of LOG_CPI:Period LOG_M1 LOG_RF LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 6.53E-06 0.000197 0.000270 0.000346 0.002764
(0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00016)
2 0.000942 1.29E-05 2.23E-05 4.43E-05 0.000350
(0.00025) (0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00025)
3 0.000377 0.000434 0.000145 0.000245 0.000755
(0.00027) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00025)
4 0.000745 0.000191 0.000187 −0.000120 0.001046
(0.00028) (0.00027) (0.00026) (0.00025) (0.00025)
Cholesky Ordering LOG_M1, LOG_RF, LOG_SBS, LOG_GDP, LOG_CPI
The impact of shadow banking on the implementation of Chinese...
Table 7 Impulse-response magnitudes (RF before M1)
Response of LOG_RF: Period LOG_RF LOG_M1 LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 0.000674 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
(3.9E-05) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
2 0.000589 −6.79E-05 2.31E-05 −4.30E-05 0.000122
(6.8E-05) (6.0E-05) (5.8E-05) (5.8E-05) (6.0E-05)
3 0.000537 −2.48E-05 −3.17E-05 −1.23E-05 0.000148
(8.4E-05) (7.9E-05) (7.8E-05) (7.1E-05) (7.8E-05)
4 0.000711 −6.28E-06 −4.69E-05 1.99E-05 0.000164
(0.00010) (9.1E-05) (8.8E-05) (7.6E-05) (8.3E-05)
Response of LOG_M1: Period LOG_RF LOG_M1 LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 −9.13E-05 0.008893 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
(0.00074) (0.00052) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
2 −5.75E-06 −0.001096 0.001936 0.000188 0.001574
(0.00079) (0.00080) (0.00077) (0.00076) (0.00079)
3 0.000127 −0.000683 −0.000641 −0.000135 0.001096
(0.00079) (0.00080) (0.00077) (0.00076) (0.00079)
4 −0.001902 0.001508 0.001104 0.000290 0.001041
(0.00080) (0.00080) (0.00076) (0.00073) (0.00075)
Response of LOG_SBS: Period LOG_RF LOG_M1 LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 0.008540 0.134826 0.419338 0.000000 0.000000
(0.03646) (0.03559) (0.02454) (0.00000) (0.00000)
2 0.034893 −0.186222 −0.183078 −0.011754 0.057156
(0.04352) (0.04283) (0.03911) (0.03726) (0.03908)
3 −0.024802 0.004535 −0.026557 −0.003784 −0.025209
(0.04350) (0.04441) (0.04256) (0.04348) (0.04442)
4 −0.051611 −0.005920 0.108986 0.009791 0.028276
(0.04407) (0.04437) (0.04171) (0.04202) (0.04333)
Response of LOG_GDP: Period LOG_RF LOG_M1 LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 −0.000613 −0.000205 0.000842 0.008424 0.000000
(0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00049) (0.00000)
2 −0.000151 0.000339 2.32E-05 0.002943 −0.001367
(0.00077) (0.00078) (0.00077) (0.00074) (0.00075)
3 0.001593 0.000195 0.000151 0.003487 −0.001013
(0.00083) (0.00083) (0.00082) (0.00074) (0.00076)
4 0.002279 0.000556 0.000639 0.002948 0.000826
(0.00088) (0.00086) (0.00084) (0.00073) (0.00075)
Response of LOG_CPI: Period LOG_RF LOG_M1 LOG_SBS LOG_GDP LOG_CPI
1 0.000197 8.55E-06 0.000270 0.000346 0.002764
(0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00016)
2 3.22E-06 0.000942 2.23E-05 4.43E-05 0.000350
(0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00025)
3 0.000430 0.000382 0.000145 0.000245 0.000755
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00025)
4 0.000183 0.000747 0.000187 −0.000120 0.001046
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00026) (0.00025) (0.00025)
Cholesky Ordering LOG_RF, LOG_M1, LOG_SBS, LOG_GDP, LOG_CPI
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Co-integration test Given 4 lags, we test for co-integration of the I(1) series. Table 4
shows that stable long-term co-integration relationships exists for the five variables at
the 5% significance level.
Granger causality test Following the standard procedure of Toda andYamamoto (1995)
as illustrated inLütkepohl (2006),we test forGrangerCausality (GC) by considering 4 lags
in the Wald test and then considering the extra lag due to I(1) series by adding a 5th lag as
exogenous variables. The results are reported in Table 5. We can notice the following
relationships: Firstly the shadow banking system granger causality tests shows it affects
the GDP at the 5% significance level. Secondly, GDP and Shadow Banking influence the
monetaryaggregateM1at the5%and10%significance levels.Thirdly, the shadowbanking
system and money supply Granger cause the interest rate at the 10% significance level.
Finally the interest rate seems to also Granger cause the shadow banking sector at the 10%
significance level.Overall our results suggest that the shadowbankingsystemhasan impact
on GDP,M1 and RF suggesting that it has a significant influence on the Chinese economy
andmonetary indicators.
Impulse-response functions We consider the log of all variables, so that the impact of
Choleski one standard deviation innovation can be measured in percentage terms. The
response functions of M1, RF, SBS, GDP and CPI to each other, with the confidence
intervals, are illustrated in Fig. 5 (Tables 6 and 7).14
We notice that the response of the shadow banking system size to M1 in the beginning
is positive and the largest in comparison with the other three variables. Moreover,
according to the chart, even if a following negative response of the shadow banking
system follows the positive shock, the effect stays positive after 3 lags and then gradually
fades to zero after lag 4.We interpret this result as showing that loosemonetary policy will
initially increase the scale of shadow banking through supplying shadow banking with
cheap liquidity, but then this is later partially offset by decreasing demand for shadow
banking products. Related to this, we note the initial positive response of shadow banking
to a rise in interest rates which is consistent with the fact that if the financing costs of banks
are high the shadow banking can offer the cheap financing products. We also notice a
small but consistently positive effect of shadow banking on GDP. In results, available
from the authors upon request, we estimate a VECM model that confirms the main
properties noticed in the impulse-response analysis.15
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the relationship among Chinese shadow banking system size,
the effectiveness of monetary policy and the economic growth in China. Our institu-
tional review indicates that the shadow banking sector in China while growing rapidly,
14 We first order money supply M1 before interest rate RF, so that we consider it as a money supply shock; we
then order money supply M1 after interest rate RF, so that implicitly one can consider the shock to M1 as a
money demand shock. We do not find significantly different results with the two orderings. We thank a referee
for this useful remark.
15 Since we estimate it by OLS, we take the results as potentially affected by endogeneity biases, nevertheless
the estimation provides a useful check.
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is still at a developing stage in comparison with the shadow banking sector in western
countries. The financing products of the western shadow banking sector are more
complex and developed than those of China. However, we notice that some funda-
mental characteristics of the shadow banking system are the same in both Western
economies and China these include high leverage, credit creation, maturity mismatch
and lack of transparency.
This paper has used empirical tests to show that the shadow banking system can
positively impact on economic growth, interest rates and money supply increases in
China. Our empirical analysis while suggesting that the shadow banking sector can
positively affect economic growth cannot say much about the magnitude of this effect.
Moreover, the effect of shadow banking sector of a money supply increase is
significant in comparison with other variables. We contribute to the recent debate on
the effect of bank lending on the efficacy of the monetary policy in China and show that
Shadow Banking works independently from standard monetary policy by amplifying
increases in the money supply but weakening the effects of restrictive interest rate-
based monetary policy decisions. Our results provide some empirical support to the
papers of Fernald et al. (2014) and Hou and Wang (2013) in showing that bank lending
is increasingly independent from the PBOC.
As a suggested agenda for future research, it is clear that the shadow banking sector
needs to be fully incorporated into the modelling of the Chinese financial sector and the
impact of the financial sector on the Chinese economy and vice-versa needs to be
appropriately modelled. It is also likely that in future years the Shadow Banking sector
in China will itself evolve and become both more sophisticated and perhaps more
regulated than it currently is. Chinese policy makers are unlikely to permit such a
rapidly growing and important part of their financial system to evolve without greater
regulation. This will inevitably change and influence the way that the Shadow Banking
system affects the implementation of monetary policy.
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